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Abstract 
Many countries claim foreign cultural goods threaten their national identities and engage in 
protectionism against foreign cultural goods with various policy interventions. We analyze the 
economics of domestic cultural content protection in terrestrial broadcasting, the most 
widespread policy instrument used in broadcasting. Using the love-of-variety approach, we 
model a representative consumer deriving utility from broadcasting services net of advertising, 
and allocating scarce time between consuming the various broadcasting services and leisure. 
Advertising is a nuisance; it costs time yet brings no utility. Broadcasting is a pure public good; 
broadcasters make profit in the monopolistic competition environment by bundling advertising 
with valuable cultural content. We impose a discrete domestic content requirement and then 
investigate the effects of its marginal changes on consumption of domestic broadcasting. 
Domestic content requirement may reduce (increase) consumption of domestic programs when 
consumer’s demand is highly elastic (inelastic), the degree of preference for foreign content over 
domestic content is high (low) and opportunity cost of listening time is high (low). The reduction 
occurs because the consumer reshuffles her consumption bundle towards leisure away from high 
domestic-content stations thereby reducing the overall aggregate consumption of broadcasting, 
and subsequently, the overall aggregate consumption of domestic programs.  
 
Keywords: domestic content, service trade, broadcasting, protection 
JEL Code: F13, L82I. Introduction 
Despites its numerous benefits, globalization is alleged to be a serious threat to countries’ 
national identities, especially by policymakers and mercantilist interests.
1 A perceived tradeoff 
between increasing economic integration and diminishing national identity is at the center of 
trade and cultural debates
2 as evidenced by the current negotiations on trade in services 
mandated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Trade in services has been expanding remarkably, especially in 
entertainment services, such as music and movie industries, exacerbating this controversy on the 
loss of cultural identity. Many countries use exemption clauses of GATS in order to cope with 
“cultural externality” of economic integration.
3 They engage in “cultural protectionism” favoring 
and implicitly subsidizing domestic producers of cultural goods over their foreign competitors. 
  Television broadcasting and movie industries have been particularly targeted. Decreasing 
domestic-programming content in the broadcasting industry and the increasing dominance of 
(American) blockbusters in the movie industry are example of the perceived threats. Only a 
handful of countries, including the United States, have refrained from adopting such policy. The 
European Union (EU) requires broadcasters in member states to reserve a majority proportion of 
their transmission time for EU work.
4 Within the EU, The most active proponent of content 
regulations is France where, for example, at least 40% of all songs played on the radio should be 
in French after the infamous “Loi Toubon”.
5 Similarly, Canadian regulation stipulates that each 
week at least 35% of popular musical selections by commercial stations are Canadian and 65% 
                                                           
1 For example, a “Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions“ was 
adopted at the 33rd UNESCO general convention in October 2005. 
2 See Cowen (2002) and Bernier (2003-2004) for a review of the cultural issues brought up by globalization. 
3 For example, articles XIV(a) of GATS and Annex on Communications to GATS 2(b).  
4 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 adopted by the European Union, Chapter III, Article 4.1. 
5 Minister Toubon was nicknamed Mr. Allgood after he imposed his cultural policy (The Economist (1996)). 
  1of the popular vocal music selections French-language stations broadcast are in French.
6 For 
television, the Canadian requirement is stricter and requires that 60% of all programming be of a 
local origin. Even in states that are viewed as culturally conservative with little threat to domestic 
culture, like South Korea, legislators passed laws limiting foreign content.
7 The regulation takes 
an extreme form on some of the countries of the former Soviet Union. For example, in 
Kazakhstan, the Russian language vastly dominates the official Kazakh language, but the 
government requires that half of all programming to be done in Kazakh.
8  
  However, despite the predominance of these regulations, it is unclear that they work as 
intended, as Acheson and Maule [2002] noted for the Canadian cultural protection initiatives. 
Two key stylized facts to note is that actual regulations are round-about instruments to increase 
the absolute consumption of domestic programs by imposing a relative restriction on production 
(broadcasting), and that broadcasted content is often a public good.  
  Quantifying cultural loss from trade in cultural goods is a difficult task involving some 
arbitrary metric of cultural externalities. We aim more realistically to look at the allocative 
implications of the predominant domestic cultural content policy used by governments to 
“protect” domestic culture. In the case of terrestrial broadcasting, policymakers typically choose 
linguistic erosion as an indicator of the cultural loss and regulate the domestic linguistic content 
of programming. Market failures are often used to motivate domestic cultural protection. The 
most prevalent alleged failure is abuses of market power by providers of entertainment (Francois 
and van Ypersele (2002), Farchy (1999), Sapir (1991), and Shao (1995)). The second one is the 
failure of consumers to endogenize the positive externalities generated by higher domestic 
cultural content (Cwi (1980), Globerman (1983), Sapir (1991), Richardson (2006), and Shao 
                                                           
6 Canadian Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., 1991, c. 11, Article 10.1.  
7 Article 71(1) of the Republic of South Korea’s Broadcasting Act. 
8 The law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 23 July 1999, #451-1 “About Means of Mass Information”, article 3.2. 
  2(1995)). The first rationale applies primarily to the movie industry where domestic (non US) 
movie producers are marginalized by vertically integrated Hollywood studios.
9 The second type 
of failure applies to radio and television broadcasting. The latter is usually non rival and lacks 
direct pricing. Our analysis addresses this second important case and looks at domestic 
cultural/linguistic content requirement in terrestrial broadcasting.  
  Our paper contributes to the literature on the economics of cultural policy in an open 
economy context hence to the international trade literature. The latter has elucidated the 
economics of domestic content protection of private goods in various contexts (Grossman 
(1981), Mussa (1984), Hollander (1987), Vousden (1987), Krishna and Itoh (1988), Richardson 
(1991), Beghin and Sumner (1992), and others). Our paper fills a near void in this content 
literature by analyzing the effects of a domestic content requirement (DCR) on public goods. We 
investigate the allocative effects of domestic cultural protection policies in terrestrial 
broadcasting industries.
10 The context of expanding trade in entertainment services re-enforces 
the pertinence of our analysis. 
  Using the love-of-variety approach, we model a representative consumer deriving utility 
from consuming broadcasting services net of advertising, and allocating scarce time between 
consuming the various broadcasting services and leisure. Advertising is a nuisance; it costs time 
yet brings no utility. Broadcasting is a pure public good; broadcasters make profit in the 
monopolistic competition environment by bundling advertising with valuable cultural content. 
Each broadcaster provides a unique mix of domestic and foreign contents. We impose a discrete 
DCR and then investigate the effects of its marginal changes on consumption of domestic 
                                                           
9 Francois and van Ypersele (2002) show that restrictions on trade in the movie industry may help resurrect 
production of valuable cultural genres by both the exporter and importer and may increase welfare under increasing 
returns to scale technologies and discrete valuations of domestic and foreign movies by consumers. 
10 Richardson (2006) provides a related analysis using a  duopoly model with a different treatment of consumer 
preferences and advertising. The few empirical analyses of the implications of cultural content protection on welfare 
(e.g., Anderson, Swimmer and Suen (1997)) do not consider the non-rivalness of broadcasting. 
  3broadcasting.  
  We find that the effectiveness of DCR policies depends crucially on consumer 
preferences. A DCR may reduce (increase) consumption of domestic programs when consumer’s 
demand is highly elastic (inelastic), the degree of preference for foreign content over domestic 
content is high (low), and opportunity cost of listening time is high (low). The reduction occurs 
because the consumer reshuffles her consumption bundle towards leisure away from high 
domestic-content stations thereby reducing the overall aggregate consumption of broadcasting, 
and subsequently, the overall aggregate consumption of domestic programs. The implication of 
this result is that a minimum DCR may be an effective policy is some EU and Latin American 
countries, French-speaking provinces of Canada, and Australia but likely to fail in countries 
where language is the main obstacle for consumption of domestic programming. The latter might 
be some of the Baltic and Central Asian states where consumers strictly prefer foreign music to 
domestic music.  
 
2. The Model 
We define consumer preferences over various radio broadcasting genres (e.g., rock, pop, rap, 
classical music or their combination) so that each genre is covered only by one station.
11 Each 
genre represents a unique mix of domestic and foreign content. Since the broadcasting industry is 
characterized by increasing returns to scale technology we assume that broadcasters face only 
fixed costs and derive revenue by selling air time to advertisers. Advertising is modeled as a 
nuisance - it brings zero utility but costs scarce time. However, broadcasters bundle advertising 
                                                           
11 To avoid the problem of non-existence of equilibrium in the Bertrand games we require that each station serves its 
genre exclusively. This could be achieved two ways. Either, one assumes that the policymaker assigns each genre to 
each station through licensing of radio and television frequencies with large penalties for violation. Then, firms 
simultaneously choose their strategies. Or, each station is assumed to face fixed startup costs. Then, firms 
sequentially choose their strategies, and no firm enters the same market (genre) as stations before it. Therefore, each 
genre is served by a single station. We innocuously assume the former case. 
  4with real content in fixed proportions, “forcing” the consumer to consume advertising whenever 
she consumes broadcasting services. This feature of our model allows us to derive the price of 
consumption of broadcasting in term of time units.
12 For any broadcaster, we define the ratio of 
its domestic content to total cultural content asβ . We use β  to characterize genres
13 and assume 
that .   [] 0,1 U β ∼
A representative consumer derives utility from consumption of broadcasting and leisure where 
the utility is quasilinear with respect to leisure. Define the triplet of variables  ( ) ( ) () ,, df qq ββ l  as 
the consumption of domestic programs of genreβ , foreign programs of genre β  and leisure, 
respectively. Then, the utility function takes the following form:  



























+ ⎟  (1) 
where  1 σ >  is the elasticity of substitution between genres and λ is the concavity parameter that 
regulates the aggregate expenditure on consumption of broadcasting. Function  () γ β  is the 
weight of each genre. We assume that preferences over foreign and domestic content for each 







<≤ , which 
guarantees that this utility function satisfies all the regularity conditions (increasing utility, and 
negative semi-definite Hessian matrix of the second-order derivatives of the utility function with 
respect to choice variables). We also impose negative off-diagonal elements of the Hessian 
                                                           
12 The original formulation of broadcasting industries in continuous setups is found in Berry and Waldfogel (1999) 
and Anderson and Coate (2003). In the latter, private companies derive revenues from pure public goods despite 
absence of direct pricing of the good. 
13 For the case of radio broadcasting, one may assume that there exist two types of music,- popular music (high in 
foreign content) and folklore (low in foreign content). Then, the ratio of folklore music to the sum of folklore and 
popular music defines a genre. A positive monotonic mapping between proportion of folklore in the total music 
content and proportion of domestic content in the total cultural content leads to  β  as a genre parameter.  
  5matrix that guarantee gross substitutability of the genres.
14  
A key feature of the above utility function is that a representative consumer derives utility 
from consumption of only foreign and domestic content. However, because stations bundle 
advertising with broadcasting the former costs time and advertising is a nuisance. This 
specification allows us to “price” broadcasting and generate revenues for broadcasters.  
The consumer maximizes her utility function subject to the constraint that the total time 
spent on consumption of broadcasting and leisure does not exceed her time endowment, which 
we normalized to unity. Denote  ( ) b β  as the consumption of broadcasting that consists of 
domestic content, foreign content, and advertising, and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, dfa β ββ  as their respective 
shares in total volume of broadcasting for genreβ . Further, define consumption of advertising of 
genre β  as ( ) a q β . Then, we have the following identities:  ( ) ( )( ) ( dfa qqqb ) β ββ ++≡ β
≡
, and 
. Hence, the utility function can be restated as follows:  () () ()1 dfa βββ ++




























⎟  (2) 
Inspection of utility function given by equation (2) reveals that each broadcasting demand 











. It is convenient to define its inverse 


















                                                          
 to which hereunder we refer as virtual price. The higher the 
proportions of both foreign and domestic content are (or lower proportion of the advertising) and 
the higher the weight of a genre in the utility function compared to other genres is, the lower is 
 
14 This utility specification can be generalized to heterogeneous consumers as long as heterogeneity comes from 
different valuation of subutility from broadcasting to allow tractable aggregation of individual demands. 
  6the virtual price faced by consumer.  
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. Restrictions on the concavity parameter λ  guarantee that 
01 φ ≤≤ . Solving the utility maximization problem yields broadcasting demands  











− ≡∫  is the aggregate virtual price index. Even though the aggregate price 
index is independent of each individual virtual price, it does depend on the aggregate level of 
prices. This implies that marginal shocks in prices have no marginal effect on the aggregate price 
level, however, discrete fluctuations in prices lead to changes in the aggregate price index.  
  We assume that all stations (or firms) have identical cost structure, namely, given the 
public nature of broadcasting, each firm face the same fixed cost. Without loss of generality we 
normalize fixed costs at zero. Combined with the assumption that each station has exclusive 
rights to its genre, the market has the attributes of monopolistic competition. Stations derive their 
revenues by bundling together “real” content and advertising and consumers cannot unbundle 
them.
15 The price of advertising,  ( ) . p , is assumed to be linearly increasing in the firm’s share of 




≡ , where  ()
1
0
B bd β β ≡∫  is the aggregate demand for 
broadcasting. The broadcaster’s problem is 
                                                           
15 We abstract from cases where consumers can suppress advertising, such as when using recording devices like 
TiVo. 
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()() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, max *1, . . 0,
df pB a s t
ββ πβ β β πβ ≡≥  (5) 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( *1 1 *1 ad f ββ =− − ) β  is the total amount of advertising during the time period, in 
minutes. Broadcasters behave strategically and the industry reaches best-reply equilibrium. For 
simplicity, we assume that each station broadcast all the time. This assumption is motivated by 
zero variable cost and because broadcasters my not know exactly when the consumer will tune 
in.  
Then, the first-order conditions for an interior solution for profit maximization for station 
serving genre β  are: 
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0 ,  and  (6) 
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⎟ , where the asterisk denotes the unconstrained equilibrium levels. Thus, 












16 Parameters β  and () 1 β −  are 
respectively the most-preferred by consumer proportions of domestic and foreign programs in 
the total provided broadcasting bundle. However, broadcasting is provided only when it brings 
profits to a station, in our case, by means of advertising. Therefore, provided content is always 
worse than the most-desirable content. As elasticity of substitution between genres approaches 
infinity, the disparity between the two vanishes.  
                                                           
16 When the consumer values genres equally, the model yields equal virtual prices, and all genres yield the same 





− .  
  8The second-order conditions of profit maximization require the Hessian of the second-
order derivatives of the profit function with respect to the choice variables to be negative semi-
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≥ , these second-order 
conditions hold. 
By aggregating over all broadcasting firms, the aggregate market consumption of 
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3. Effects of the Domestic Content Requirement 
As broadcasting is a public good that lacks direct pricing, the policymaker attempts to reach his 
cultural consumption objective by imposing the cultural policy on broadcasters. We assume the 
policymaker forces producers to incorporate higher shares of domestic programming in their 
broadcastings by imposing a minimum level on the share of domestic content in total 
broadcasting time. Presumably, the consumer will increase her consumption of domestic 
broadcasted culture as well. We now assess the validity of this conjecture that imposing a 
cultural DCR on broadcasters leads to higher consumption of domestic programming. To 
account for feedback effects between stations to changes in DCR we first impose a discrete DCR 
and then derive the effects of marginal changes in DCR around its initial level on the aggregate 
consumption of domestic programming as in Mussa (1984). The most common form of DCR in 
broadcasting is to require that domestic programming constitutes a minimum fraction of 
  9aggregate broadcasting. Formally, defining a policy instrument as δ  we have DCR requiring 
( ) d δ β ≥ . 
When the policy maker imposes the DCR policy, the constraint binds for all stations with 
genres β  such that  ()








. Therefore, each of these stations,
17 
instead of solving equations (6) and (7), now solves:  
  ( ) , d β δ =  (9) 
and 
  () () ( ) ( )
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 (10) 











. We denote constrained 
solutions and their functions with over-hats. Combining solutions yields constrained virtual price 
() () ()
() () ()




β ββ σβ δδ
βγ β
σβ β β
− − − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ − ⎜⎟
⎟
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ +− − − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠












proportional change in the virtual price to changes in the DCR has an ambiguous sign because 
only the stations serving genres β δ ≤  experience drop in prices. Other constrained stations with 





⎛⎞ <≤ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 
actually increase their prices when the DCR policy is imposed. This happens because for firms 
that find themselves strictly constrained (β δ ≤ ), the attractiveness of the genre decreases 
(“content effect”). The fall in the advertising level
18 (and lower virtual price) is not sufficient to 
offset the fall in the attractiveness caused by the provision of the sub-optimal content. On the 
                                                           
17 We assume that the penalty for non-compliance with the DCR is prohibitive.. 
18  () () () ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 11 11 1 au u a δδ β β δ =− − − − + − ⇒ ∂∂≤ 0 .  








 experience a net drop in virtual prices 
because the lower advertising level (“advertising effect”) dominates the effect caused by 
provision of sub-optimal content. As the elasticity of substitution between genres goes up, the 
range of stations that raise prices in response to the policy shrinks. This is attributed to the fact 
that, ceteris paribus, the consumer values the composition of desirable content higher than the 








⎟ . We do not, however, consider such cases in our analysis due to lack of their 
appeal in the real world.  
The interaction of the “content effect” and “advertising effect” introduces ambiguity to 
the effect of DCR on the consumption of domestic content. Since the focus of our paper is the 
distortion of the consumption of domestic programs brought about by the DCR, we assume, for 
analytical tractability, that the representative consumer always values low-domestic-content 
genres higher than high-domestic-content ones so that virtual prices of the low-domestic-content 
stations remain higher than high-domestic-content stations even after a DCR is imposed.
 It is 







11 1 11 1
γβ σ β δ
γβ σ β δ σ β
⎡⎤ ′ −−
−− ⎢
+− − +− − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
≤ ⎥ .
19 By imposing this restriction we 
mitigate the “advertising effect” in favor of  the “content effect”. We concentrate on sufficient 
conditions therefore further restrict our attention on cases where  2 σ ≥ . In the numerical analysis 
section, we relax this assumption and show that the results are robust under milder conditions. 
                                                           
19 The derivative of  ( ) ˆ z β  with respect to  β  is proportional to the given expression. 
  11We define an aggregate price index for all stations as 



























≡ ∫ . When the DCR constraint is binding, the aggregate demand is given 
by  , where 
* ˆ BB + ()
1
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. Having defined the aggregate 
broadcasting demand, the aggregate consumption of domestic programming is given by 
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. The assumptions of  ( ) γ β  
falling sufficiently fast and  2 σ ≥  were required for δ β ≥
20 which implies that, on average, 
representative consumer is made worse off by the policy due to higher average virtual price of 
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. Similarly, it represents the weighted-average most-
                                                           
20  () () () ( ) ( )
1 ˆˆ 00 1 2 1 zz
σ ββ β β β δ σ σ δ σ
− ∂∂ ≥ ⇒ ∂ ∂ ≤ ⇒ ≤ − ≤ ∀ ≥ 2  









as the share of the constrained aggregate demand in the total aggregate demand for broadcasting 
services. Then, the marginal effect of tightening the DCR on aggregate consumption of domestic 
broadcasting is given by  
 
() ( ) ( ) () () ( )
()
ˆ 11 1 1
ˆ 1
11
D φμσ δβ φ β μσ δβ
δδ δ δ
⎡⎤ −− − − − − ∂ ⎢⎥ =Β − +
∂− − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. (12) 
We are now able to state our analytical results: 
Proposition 1  
Under the assumptions of Sections 2 and 3, the effect of marginal changes in the DCR around an 
initially binding level on consumption of domestic programs consists of three effects: (i) a direct 
increase in the share of domestic programs in the total volume of broadcasting,  ; (ii) a 
reduction in the consumption of broadcasting of constrained stations, 
ˆ B








(negative if  2 σ ≥ ); and (iii) an increase in the aggregate consumption of broadcasting of 
unconstrained stations, 








 (positive for  2 σ ≥ ). The sum of these effects 
has an ambiguous sign.  
Proposition 2 
Under the assumptions of Sections 2 and 3, there exists a non empty set of parameters 
(( , ) σ λ and functional forms of genres distribution function  ( ) γ β  leading to positive and 
negative effects of the DCR policy on aggregate consumption of domestic programs. There exist 
parameter values and functional forms of  ( ) γ β  under which consumption of domestic 
programming can be maximized with respect to the DCR, and for which levels of constrained 
  13consumption of domestic programs is lower than the unregulated consumption (overshooting).  
Proof of propositions. The fact that the direct effect is always positive is trivial. The signs of 
indirect effects depend on the sign of δ β −  through our assumption on the curvature of the 
weight function  ( ) γ β  and  2 σ ≥ . Both guarantee that  0 δβ − ≥ . By inspecting equation (12) 
we observe that for just binding policy,  0 δ = , marginal changes in DCR have no effect on the 
consumption of the domestic programming because  ˆ 0 B =  by construction and 
0 lim 1
δ β δ
→ = . 
Ultramarginal increases in δ  increase  ˆ B making the direct effect strictly positive. At small 
values of DCR  0 μ ≈  and  0 δ β −≈ so that indirect effects, 
( )( )( ) 11
0
1
















 (again, we’ve used 
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λ σ λσ σ
βγ β β
σ
− − −− − ⎛⎞ =⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∫
1 d ) . To show that there exist parameter values of ( , σ λ  and 
functional forms of  ( ) γ β  such that
* ˆ DD ≤  we set  ( ) 12 γβ=  and  6 σ = . These value yield 
. Therefore, given that the set of 
* ˆ 0 DD −< δ  is compact and that function   is continuous in  ˆ D
δ , there exist at least one maximum and at least one point where constrained and unconstrained 
consumptions of domestic programs are equal. Given that the set of δ  is compact and convex, 
there exist a range of values of δ  where (i) the discrete DCR policy increase (decreases) 
consumption of domestic programming and/or (ii) DCR policy yields consumption of domestic 
  14programs higher (lower) than in the unconstrained economy■ 
The effect of DCR on aggregate consumption of domestic programming consists of three 
effects. The first effect,  , is a direct effect, the second effect,  ˆ B







, is the 
indirect effect of change in consumption of domestic programs of constrained stations, and the 
third effect, 








, is the indirect effect of change in consumption of domestic 
programs of unconstrained stations. Assume we have the set of parameters that guarantee β δ ≤  
and   reaches a unique global maximum. When the initial  ˆ D δ  is small, the positive change in 
consumption of unconstrained stations is the dominating effect because this is where most of the 
consumption of broadcasting is concentrated prior to the policy change. However, as policyδ  
increases further, its rate of increase slows down and at the same time the negative effect of 
change in consumption of constrained stations becomes noticeable. Share parameter μ  is large 
(closer to 1) for strictly binding levels of DCR by the assumption that the consumer favors low-
domestic-content stations to high-domestic-content stations. Therefore, an important requirement 
for the second effect having an impact on the overall sign of the equation (12) is φ  being small. 
The latter is achieved at either small values of elasticity of substitution between genres or/and 
large value of the concavity parameter. In a sense, in societies with poor substitution among 
various genres, consumers do not change they consumption habits despite unfavorable virtual 
prices brought about by DCR policy. High value of the concavity parameter implies that the 
policy pushes the consumer to switch away from broadcasting altogether rather than switch to 
stations that offer different mix of foreign and domestic content. As the policymaker sets the 
DCR subsequently at higher larger levels, at some point, the indirect effect of decreased 
  15consumption of constrained stations overcomes both the positive direct effect and positive 
indirect effect of change in consumption of unconstrained stations. This is the point where 
consumption of domestic programs reaches its maximum. Denote this point as 
( ) { } 0 ˆ 0 D δδ δ ≡∂ ∂ = . Any increase in δ  past this point lowers the consumption of domestic 
programs below its maximum. At such level of DCR, the share of constrained demand in total 
demand for broadcasting is substantial which makes the impact of the indirect, third effect pale 
in comparison with the indirect, second effect. If the policymaker chooses a DCR larger 
than 0 δ (overshooting), the indirect effect of decrease in consumption of constrained stations may 
become so severe that the amount of consumption of domestic programs attained under such 
policy may be no larger than the amount where policy is not in place. We denote such point as 
{ }
*
1 ˆ D D δδ ≡= . Any DCR policy setting δ  beyond  1 δ  is then totally counterproductive in 
inducing an increase in domestic-program consumption above its unconstrained level D*.  
 
4. Numerical Analysis  
We use numerical analysis to overcome the analytical intractability of the two second-order 
effects in equation (12), to investigate the effect of different parameters on the effectiveness of 
the DCR policy. We consider three hallmark cases of the distribution of preferences over stations 
(parameter ( () γ β ): (1) the case where individual preferences over genres are uniformly 
distributed, (2) the case where individuals preferences are skewed towards stations with low 
domestic content (say popular music); and (3) the case where individual preferences over genres 
are concentrated in the middle, which we denote as “balanced.” Case (1) is indicative of 
countries where there is no language barrier to consumption of domestic program and people are 
more “liberal” in terms of accepting foreign cultures and traditions. That, for example, could be 
  16the case of Australia, some parts of Canada and Latin American countries. On the other hand, 
case (2) is assumed to characterize countries with strong language barrier while case (3) can be 
attributed to countries where people prefer balanced programming, in terms of foreign and 
domestic contents. Countries that fit the second case are former Soviet republics while EU 
member-countries may fit the third case. We choose distribution of function  ( ) γ β  such that it 
integrates to 12 over β  over the unit interval. 
4.1.  Uniform distribution of preferences over genres 
We set  ()12 γβ=  for all β  and assume that  0.9 λ = . Then, aggregate consumption of 
domestic programming as a function of DCR δ is depicted in Graph 1.1. 
Graph 1.1:  Aggregate consumption of domestic programming for different values 
of the elasticity parameter 
 
As shown in Graph 1.1, under uniformly-distributed preferences, the higher is the 
elasticity of substitution between genres, the more effective the DCR policy is to increase the 
domestic-program consumption beyond its unconstrained level (dashes). Constrained stations 
become less competitive by offering a less attractive mix of foreign and domestic content. A 
higher elasticity of substitution eases switching towards stations that are not restricted by the 
policy and which offer a more attractive content mix (better “priced”). Since the latter stations 
  17also provide relatively higher domestic content ratio, the overall consumption of domestic 
programs increases. Consumption only starts to fall at very large policy levels of DCR when the 
lion’s share of consumption is directed towards leisure.  
By solving for two critical points of interest  0 δ  and  1 δ  as a function of the elasticity of 
substitution between stations we obtain Graph 1.2. 
Graph 1.2:  Critical points 0 δ  and  1 δ  as a function of σ  











Note: 0 δ  and  1 δ  are indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
Since critical points ( ) 01 , δ δ  are unique, they provide the following intuition. If the goal of the 
policymaker is to achieve the maximum consumption of domestic shows/music then the range of 
the size of the DCR policy that leads to overshooting is wider the larger is the elasticity of 
substitution between genres. Therefore, it may pay to reduce an initially large DCR policy as in 
“cultural” Laffer curve. Graphs 1.1 and 1.2 together lead to further policy implications. If the 
goal of a policymaker is to increase consumption of domestic programs over unconstrained level 
then the DCR policy is more likely to succeed in societies where stations are close substitutes. 
Even if the policy overshoots it still may increase consumption above its unconstrained level as 
the elasticity of substitution gets larger. 
  18Next, we assume 10 σ =  and let λ, the concavity parameter between aggregate 
expenditure and leisure, vary. Graph 1.3 shows the consumption of domestic programming as a 
function of the DCR policy. 
Graph 1.3:  Aggregate consumption of domestic programming and DCR for different 
values of the concavity parameter 
 
The concavity parameter regulates the ease of substitution between consumption of 
broadcasting and consumption of leisure. The larger is the concavity parameter the more eager is 
the consumer to switch between broadcasting and leisure. When concavity parameter approaches 
one then broadcasting and leisure become perfect substitutes. Therefore, one may deem the 
concavity parameter as a proxy for the opportunity cost of time consuming broadcasting. Graph 
1.3 shows that for small concavity parameter values, the consumer reshuffles her portfolio away 
from broadcasting slower than the proportion of domestic programming increases. Therefore, 
consumption of domestic programs is monotonically increasing in the DCR conditioned on small 
values of λ. At higher concavity parameter values, the consumer consumes less of (domestic) 
broadcasting and as the DCR increases, it eventually overshoots as the consumer switches away 
from radio listening to leisure and the effectiveness of the DCR falls. Graph 1.4 shows how 
  19critical value  0 δ  evolves with changes in concavity parameterλ. When the concavity parameter 
increases, the DCR is more likely to overshoot the optimal level of the DCR because  0 δ  falls. 
The intuition remains the same. As λ increases, leisure becomes a better substitute for 
broadcasting and the consumer is less reluctant to tolerate suboptimal mix of domestic and 
foreign content. Graphically, the higher is the concavity parameter the faster the constrained 
consumption of domestic programs curve bends down. Therefore, both, the critical point where 
the constrained consumption of domestic programs is maximized,  0 δ , and the point where DCR 
overshoots the unconstrained level,  1 δ  (if such point exists), are reached sooner.  
Graph 1.4:  Critical consumption points and concavity parameter 









δ  UniformDistributionof γ(β)  
 
Note: 0 δ  is indicated by the dashed. Critical values of  1 δ  do not exist. 
 4.2. Distribution of preferences skewed towards low-domestic-content genres. 
In this second case the distribution of genres takes a very simple form  ()1 γ β =− β  . We 
further assume that  0.9 λ = . Graph 2.1 shows the aggregate consumption of domestic program as 
a function of the DCR for different values of the elasticity of substitution between genres. In 
contrast to the case of uniform distribution of preferences, the difference between constrained 
  20and unconstrained consumptions of domestic content is more pronounced. Furthermore, the two 
critical points ( ) 01 , δ δ  are reached at smaller values of DCR policies under the skewed 
distribution of genres in comparison to the case with uniform distribution of genres. The range of 
policy for which overshooting still leads to an increase in consumption relative to the 
unconstrained level gets larger as the elasticity of substitution increases as shown in Graph 2.2. 
Graph 2.1:  Aggregate consumption of domestic programming for different values 
of the elasticity parameter 
 
Graph 2.2:  Critical consumption points under skewed distribution 








Note: 0 δ  and  1 δ  are indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
  21In contrast to the case of uniform distribution of preferences over genres, when the 
consumer prefers low-domestic-content genres to high-domestic-content stations, the larger is 
the elasticity of substitution the smaller is the optimumδ . The intuition for this result is the 
following. With skewed distribution at hand the consumer finds low-domestic-content stations 
more attractive than high-domestic-content stations. Skewed distribution of genres yields 
different prices, therefore, the higher elasticity of substitution between genres leads to higher 
desirability of leisure for any given concavity parameter. Therefore, when DCR is imposed, the 
relative lack of desirability of high-domestic-content stations is lessened, yet people are more 
prone to switch to leisure, and the larger is the elasticity of substitution between genres the larger 
is the keenness to do that. Hence, the indirect effect of falling consumption of broadcasting is 
large and overcomes the direct effect of increasing the share of domestic programs. Therefore, 
consumption of domestic programming falls.  
To plot consumption of domestic programs as a function of the concavity parameter we 
fix  10 σ = . This is shown in Graph 2.3. 
Graph 2.3:  Aggregate consumption of domestic programming as a function of DCR for 
different values of the concavity parameter 
 
  22Again, from Graph 2.3 we observe that the higher is the concavity parameter the more 
concave the constrained consumption of domestic programming becomes. As opposed to the 
uniform case, the constrained consumption of domestic programming folds back down and for 
large value of the concavity parameter it falls below the unconstrained level. Further, by 
inspecting Graph 2.3 we notice that the larger is the concavity parameter the smaller are the 
critical points ( ) 01 , δ δ , if they exist. This information is summarized in the Graph 2.4. 










δ  Skewed Distributionof γ(β)
 
Note: 0 δ  and  1 δ  are indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
4.3.Dome-shaped  distribution of preferences over genres 
Last, we assume that distribution of genres is given by  ( ) ( ) 41 γ βπ β β = − . We 
further assume that  0.9 λ = . Aggregate consumption of domestic programs is shown in Graph 
3.1. At small values of DCR the policy has essentially no effect on the consumption of domestic 
programming. Once the level of DCR approaches the “balanced” genres preferred by the 
consumer, constrained consumption starts to pick up. This, however, does not last for long since 
further increases in DCR lead to a sharp drop in consumption of domestic programs as the policy 
seriously constrains stations with the formerly most attractive content. The policy drives the 
  23wedge between the most preferred and available bundle of programming wider. Given that 
consumption of genres on the extreme is not desirable the consumer prefers to switch away from 
broadcasting to leisure.  
Graph 3.1: Aggregate consumption of domestic programming for different values of the 
elasticity parameter 
 
Plotting critical points ( ) 01 , δ δ  as a function of the elasticity of substitution between 
genres yields Graph 3.2.  
Graph 3.2:  Critical points ( ) 01 , δ δ  as a function of σ  
 
Note: 0 δ  and  1 δ  are indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
Both critical points increase in the elasticity of substitution, which means that the margin 
  24for error is larger for societies characterized by high degree of substitution between genres for 
increasing consumption of domestic program over unconstrained level and for reaching the 
maximum domestic programs’ consumption. 
Fixing elasticity of substitution at ten we then plot the consumption of domestic programs 
as a function of the concavity parameter. This is shown in Graph 3.3. 
Graph 3.3:  Aggregate consumption of domestic programming as a function of DCR for 
different values of the concavity parameter 
 
Note: Concavity parameter values are (0.1125,0.45,and 0.7875); the lower values shift the plot higher. 
 
Graph 3.3 retains some properties of Graph 3.1 in which the elasticity of substitution 
varied. At small values of the DCR, the policy has almost no effect. Once the DCR reaches the 
level of the stations most preferred by the consumer, consumption of domestic programs 
increases. For small values of the concavity parameter, domestic-program consumption increases 
steadily while for large concavity parameter it eventually falls down once policy goes far past the 
most-popular “balanced” genres. Graph 3.3 also shows that the larger is the concavity parameter 
the smaller are the critical points ( ) 01 , δ δ , if they exist at all. We combine this information in the 
Graph 3.4 
  25Graph 3.4:  Critical consumption points and concavity parameter 
 
Note: 0 δ  and  1 δ  are indicated by the dashed and continuous line respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions and Extensions 
We showed that a marginal DCR increment in an initially binding policy increases the proportion 
of domestic content of stations which were initially constrained. Because of its constraining 
nature, the increment also increases average virtual prices over constrained stations and leads to 
a decrease in consumption of constrained stations’ output and an increase in the consumption of 
unconstrained stations output. The increment in the strictly binding DCR may lead to an average 
decline in the consumption of broadcasting services when preferences are such that the consumer 
tends to substitute leisure for less-desirable radio consumption rather than other stations because 
of high opportunity-cost of time (better leisure opportunities) or large linguistic barriers. This, in 
turn, may lead to decline in the aggregate consumption for domestic programs despite the 
increase in their relative share of total radio listening. In contrast Richardson’s (2006) finds that 
tigthening the local cultural content always increases the amount (proportion)  of local music 
heard as consumers always devote a given time to radio listening. In his duopoly model, 
  26tightening a local-music quota increases the local content in the music mix played by both 
stations. This mix-effect outweighs the audience-shifting effect –more listeners for the station 
specialized into foreign music.  
  Our numerical analysis showed that, for uniform distribution of genre preferences, the 
consumption of domestic programs peaks at large values of DCR when leisure alternatives to 
radio-listening are good. The consumption of domestic program may not peak if leisure 
alternatives are less attractive (low concavity parameter λ). A policymaker could achieve an 
objective of increasing consumption of domestic programs above the unconstrained level in such 
situation (uniform taste across genres). Finding the maximum level may be an elusive pursuit. 
When consumer preferences are skewed toward stations with low-domestic content, then critical 
values (δ0, δ1) are reached at relatively small values of the DCR suggesting that policymaker 
consider exercise caution when choosing a DCR level. Finally, when people prefer balanced 
consumption of domestic and foreign content then small values of DCR have virtually no effect 
on consumption of domestic programming. A DCR set in the neighborhood of the most-preferred 
“balanced” genres increases consumption of domestic programs. Beyond that level, a slight DCR 
overshooting could reduce domestic programming consumption below its maximum attainable 
level or even below its unconstrained level.  
DCR policies are often imposed on societies that have small unconstrained consumption 
of local  content either due to high-language barrier or high-opportunity cost of time. We show 
that the policy might not work in exactly the economies characterized by these two factors. 
Countries that fall into the first category are some of the countries of the former USSR 
dominated by the Russian language. The latter might be developed countries where leisure 
opportunities abound, like Australia and the EU. The uniform distribution case is more 
  27identifiable with Latin-American countries in which demand for both foreign and domestic 
programs is strong without intervention. In fact, there are some countries where enforcement of 
the DCR policy is triggered only when the estimates of the past domestic content consumptions 
falls below certain threshold, and such thresholds have not been breached. Our numerical 
analysis suggests that policy in the latter countries is more effective yet, the case for government 
intervention is least compelling in these very countries. 
For uniform and balanced distributions of preferences for genres, we have shown that as 
the elasticity of the substitution between genres increases and the concavity parameter decreases, 
the range of values increases for which the DCR boosts aggregate consumption of domestic 
programs above its unconstrained level. Similarly, reaching the maximum consumption of 
domestic programming, is more likely to succeed the higher the elasticity of substitution between 
genres and the smaller is the concavity parameter for the cases of uniform and balanced 
distribution of genres. However, for the case of preferences skewed toward stations with low-
domestic content, reaching the maximum consumption level is more likely to succeed for 
societies with both low elasticity of substitution between genres and concavity parameter. 
Our analysis understates the potentially negative effects of a DCR policy as firms do not 
leave the market. When fixed costs of production are high then severely constrained stations may 
be forced out of the market. This will aggravate the counterproductive results of DCR policy. A 
promising extension of our model would be solving the social planner’s problem and finding a 
tax-cum-subsidy arrangement that replicates the objective of increasing consumption of domestic 
programs under less distortionary instruments. Another potential extension would be to consider 
the effects of the DCR in a general equilibrium setup. We have taken the price of advertising as 
given, however, it is possible to build a model where preferences of individuals reflect both the 
  28time and income constraint and derive price of advertising by modeling explicitly the behavior of 
advertisers. 
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